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Shuqin Li, Student Member, IEEE, and Jianwei Huang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We study the optimal usage-based pricing problem
in a resource-constrained network with one profit-maximizing
service provider and multiple groups of surplus-maximizing
users. With the assumption that the service provider knows the
utility function of each user (thus complete information), we find
that the complete price differentiation scheme can achieve a large
revenue gain (e.g., 50%) compared to no price differentiation,
when the total network resource is comparably limited and
the high willingness to pay users are minorities. However,
the complete price differentiation scheme may lead to a high
implementational complexity. To trade off the revenue against the
implementational complexity, we further study the partial price
differentiation scheme, and design a polynomial-time algorithm
that can compute the optimal partial differentiation prices. We
also consider the incomplete information case where the service
provider does not know which group each user belongs to. We
show that it is still possible to realize price differentiation under
this scenario, and provide the sufficient and necessary condition
under which an incentive compatible differentiation scheme can
achieve the same revenue as under complete information.
Index Terms—Network Pricing, Price Differentiation, Revenue
Management, Resource Allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pricing is important for the design, operation, and man-
agement of communication networks. Pricing has been used
with two different meanings in the area of communication net-
works. One is the “optimization-oriented” pricing for network
resource allocation: it is made popular by Kelly’s seminal work
on network congestion control [2], [3]. For example, the Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP) has been successfully reverse-
engineered as a congestion pricing based solution to a network
optimization problem [4], [5]. A more general framework
of Network Utility Maximization (NUM) was subsequently
developed to forward-engineer many new network protocols
(see a recent survey in [6]). In various NUM formulations, the
“optimization-oriented” prices often represent the Lagrangian
multipliers of various resource constraints and are used to
coordinate different network entities to achieve the maximum
system performance in a distributed fashion. The other is the
“economics-based” pricing, which is used by a network service
provider to various objectives including revenue maximization.
The proper design of such a pricing becomes particularly chal-
lenging today due to the exponential growth of data volume
and applications in both wireline and wireless networks. In this
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paper, we focus on studying the “economics-based” pricing
schemes for managing communication networks.
Economists have proposed many sophisticated pricing
mechanisms to extract surpluses from the consumers and
maximize revenue (or profits) for the providers. A typical
example is the optimal nonlinear pricing [7]–[9]. In practice,
however, we often observe simple pricing schemes deployed
by the service providers. Typical examples include flat-fee
pricing and (piecewise) linear usage-based pricing. One po-
tential reason behind the gap between “theory” and “practice”
is that the optimal pricing schemes derived in economics often
has a high implementational complexity. Besides a higher
maintenance cost, complex pricing schemes are not “customer-
friendly” and discourage customers from using the services
[10], [11]. Furthermore, achieving the highest possible revenue
often with complicated pricing schemes requires knowing the
information (identity and preference) of each customer, which
can be challenging in large scale communication networks. It
is then natural to ask the following two questions:
1) How to design simple pricing schemes to achieve the
best tradeoff between complexity and performance?
2) How does the network information structure impact the
design of pricing schemes?
This paper tries to answer the above two questions with
some stylized communication network models. Different from
some previous work that considered a flat-fee pricing scheme
where the payment does not depend on the resource con-
sumption (e.g., [10], [12], [13]), here we study the revenue
maximization problem with the linear usage-based pricing
schemes, where a user’s total payment is linearly proportional
to allocated resource. In wireless communication networks,
however, the usage-based pricing scheme seems to become
increasingly popular due to the rapid growth of wireless data
traffic. In June 2010, AT&T in the US switched from the
flat-free based pricing (i.e., unlimited data for a fixed fee)
to the usage-based pricing schemes for 3G wireless data [14].
Verizon followed up with similar plans in July 2011. Similar
usage-based pricing plans have been adopted by major Chinese
wireless service providers including China Mobile and China
UniCom. Thus the research on the usage-based pricing is of
great practical importance.
In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization prob-
lem of a monopolist service provider facing multiple groups
of users. Each user determines its optimal resource demand
to maximize the surplus, which is the difference between
its utility and payment. The service provider chooses the
pricing schemes to maximize his revenue, subject to a lim-
ited resource. We consider both complete information and
incomplete information scenarios and design different pricing
schemes with different implementational complexity levels.
Our main contributions are as follows.
2• Complete network information: We propose a polynomial
algorithm to compute the optimal solution of the partial
price differentiation problem, which includes the com-
plete price differentiation scheme and the single pricing
scheme as special cases. The optimal solution has a
threshold structure, which allocates positive resources to
high willingness to pay users with priorities.
• Revenue gain under the complete network information:
Compared to the single pricing scheme, we identify the
two important factors behind the revenue increase of the
(complete and partial) price differentiation schemes: the
differentiation gain and the effective market size. The
revenue gain is the most significant when high users are
minority among the whole population and total resource
is limited but not too small.
• Incomplete network information: We design an incentive-
compatible scheme with the goal to achieve the same
maximum revenue that can be achieved with the complete
information. We find that if the differences of willing-
ness to pays of users are larger than some thresholds,
this incentive-compatible scheme can achieve the same
maximum revenue. We further characterize the necessary
and sufficient condition for the thresholds.
It is interesting to compare our results under the complete
network information scenario with results in [10] and [15].
In [10], the authors showed that the revenue gain of price
differentiation is small with a flat entry-fee based Paris Metro
Pricing (e.g., [16]), and a complicated differentiation strategy
may not be worthwhile. Chau et al. [15] further derived the
sufficient conditions of congestion functions that guarantee the
viability of these Paris Metro Pricing schemes. By contrast, our
results show that the revenue gain of price differentiation can
be substantial for a usage-based pricing system.
Some recent work of usage-based pricing and revenue
management in communication network includes [17]–[24].
Basar and Srikant in [17] investigated the bandwidth allocation
problem in a single link network with the single pricing
scheme. Shen and Basar in [18] extended the study to a more
general nonlinear pricing case with the incomplete network in-
formation scenario. They discussed the single pricing scheme
under incomplete information with a continuum distribution
of users’ types. In contrast, our study on the incomplete
information focuses on the linear pricing with a discrete setting
of users’ types. We also show that, besides the single pricing
scheme, it is also possible to design differentiation pricing
schemes under incomplete information. Daoud et al. [19]
studied a uplink power allocation problem in a CDMA system,
where the interference among users are the key constraint
instead of the limited total resource considered in our paper.
Jiang et al. in [20] and Hande et al. in [21] focused on
the study of the time-dependent pricing. He and Walrand in
[22], Shakkottai and Srikant in [23] and Gajic et al. in [24]
focused on the interaction between different service providers
embodied in the pricing strategies, rather than the design of
the pricing mechanism. Besides, none of the related work
considered the partial differential pricing as in our paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network with a total amount of S limited
resource (which can be in the form of rate, bandwidth, power,
time slot, etc.). The resource is allocated by a monopolistic
service provider to a set I = {1, . . . , I} of user groups. Each
group i ∈ I has Ni homogeneous users1 with the same utility
function:
ui(si) = θi ln(1 + si), (1)
where si is the allocated resource to one user in group i and θi
represents the willingness to pay of group i. The logarithmic
utility function is commonly used to model the proportion-
ally fair resource allocation in communication networks (see
[17] for detailed explanations). The analysis of the complete
information case can also be extended to more general utility
functions (see Appendix A). Without loss of generality, we
assume that θ1 > θ2 > · · · > θI . In other words, group 1
contains users with the highest valuation, and group I contains
users with the lowest valuation.
We consider two types of information structures:
1) Complete information: the service provider knows each
user’s utility function. Though the complete information
is a very strong assumption, it is the most frequently
studied scenario the network pricing literature [17]–[24].
The significance of studying the complete information
is two-fold. It serves as the benchmark of practical de-
signs and provides important insights for the incomplete
information analysis.
2) Incomplete information: the service provider knows
the total number of groups I , the number of users in
each group Ni, i ∈ I, and the utility function of each
group ui, i ∈ I. It does not know which user belongs
to which group. Such assumption in our discrete setting
is analogous to that the service provider knows only
the users’ types distribution in a continuum case. Such
statistical information can be obtained through long term
observations of a stationary user population.
The interaction between the service provider and users can
be characterized as a two-stage Stackelberg model shown in
Fig. 1. The service provider publishes the pricing scheme in
Stage 2: Every admitted user decides s i
si
Stage1 : SP sets prices :
i i
i I
n s S
∈
≤∑
SP must 
guarantee
{ pi, ni }
YES
NO, statistical information only
Scheme 1: Complete Price Differentiation
(Section III)
Scheme 2: No Price Differentiation
(Single Pricing, Section IV)
Scheme 3: Partial Price Differentiation
(Section V) 
Scheme 1: No Price Differentiation
(Section IV)
Scheme 2: Incentive Compatible Price 
Differentiation
(Section VI)
complete information of 
each user?
Fig. 1. A two-stage Stackelberg model
Stage 1, and users respond with their demands in Stage 2.
The users want to maximize their surpluses by optimizing their
1A special case is Ni=1 for each group, i.e., all users in the network are
different.
3demands according to the pricing scheme. The service provider
wants to maximize its revenue by setting the right pricing
scheme to induce desirable demands from users. Since the
service provider has a limited total resource, it must guarantee
that the total demand from users is no larger than what it can
supply.
The details of pricing schemes depend on the information
structure of the service provider. Under complete information,
since the service provider can distinguish different groups
of users, it announces the pricing and the admission control
decisions to different groups of users. It can choose from
the complete price differentiation scheme, the single pricing
scheme, and the partial price differentiation scheme to realize
a desired trade-off between the implementational complexity
and the total revenue. Under incomplete information, it pub-
lishes a common price menu to all users, and allow users to
freely choose a particular price option in this menu. All these
pricing schemes will be discussed one by one in the following
sections.
Note that it is possible for a user to achieve an “arbitrage”
by splitting into several smaller users, each of which requests
a small amount of resource and enjoys a lower unit price.
Fortunately, preventing arbitrage of services is often easier
and less costly than that of goods [28]. For example, we
can often uniquely identify a user through its MAC address.
Full discussion of arbitrage prevention, however, is beyond the
scope of this paper.
III. COMPLETE PRICE DIFFERENTIATION UNDER
COMPLETE INFORMATION
We first consider the complete information case. Since the
service provider knows the utility and the identity of each user,
it is possible to maximize the revenue by charging a different
price to each group of users. The analysis will be based on
backward induction, starting from Stage 2 and then moving to
Stage 1.
A. User’s Surplus Maximization Problem in Stage 2
If a user in group i has been admitted into the network and
offered a linear price pi in Stage 1, then it solves the following
surplus maximization problem,
maximize
si≥0
ui(si)− pisi, (2)
which leads to the following unique optimal demand
si(pi) =
(
θi
pi
− 1
)+
, where (·)+ , max(·, 0). (3)
Remark 1: The analysis of the Stage 2 user surplus max-
imization problem is the same for all pricing schemes. The
result in (3) will be also used in Sections IV, V and VI.
B. Service Provider’s Pricing and Admission Control Problem
in Stage 1
In Stage 1, the service provider maximizes its revenue by
choosing the price pi and the number of admitted users ni
for each group i subject to the limited total resource S. The
key idea is to perform a Complete Price differentiation (CP )
scheme, i.e., charging each group with a different price.
CP : maximize
p≥0,s≥0,n
∑
i∈I
nipisi (4)
subject to si =
(
θi
pi
− 1
)+
, i ∈ I, (5)
ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni} , i ∈ I, (6)∑
i∈I
nisi ≤ S. (7)
where p ∆= {pi, i ∈ I}, s ∆= {si, i ∈ I}, and n ∆=
{ni, i ∈ I}. We use bold symbols to denote vectors in the
sequel. Constraint (5) is the solution of the Stage 2 user
surplus maximization problem in (3). Constraint (6) denotes
the admission control decision, and constraint (7) represents
the total limited resource in the network.
The CP problem is not straightforward to solve, since it is a
non-convex optimization problem with a non-convex objective
function (summation of products of ni and pi), a coupled
constraint (7), and integer variables n. However, it is possible
to convert it into an equivalent convex formulation through a
series of transformations, and thus the problem can be solved
efficiently.
First, we can remove the (·)+ sign in constraint (5) by
realizing the fact that there is no need to set pi higher than
θi for users in group i; users in group i already demand zero
resource and generate zero revenue when pi = θi. This means
that we can rewrite constraint (5) as
pi =
θi
si + 1
and si ≥ 0, i ∈ I. (8)
Plugging (8) into (4), then the objective function becomes∑
i∈I
ni
θisi
si+1
. We can further decompose the CP problem in
the following two subproblems:
1) Resource allocation: for a fixed admission control deci-
sion n, solve for the optimal resource allocation s.
CP1 : maximize
s≥0
∑
i∈I
ni
θisi
si + 1
subject to
∑
i∈I
nisi ≤ S. (9)
Denote the solution of CP1 as s∗ = (s∗i (n), ∀i ∈ I). We
further maximize the revenue of the integer admission
control variables n.
2) Admission control:
CP2 : maximize
n
∑
i∈I
ni
θis
∗
i (n)
s∗i (n) + 1
(10)
subject to ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni} , i ∈ I
Let us first solve the CP1 subproblem in s. Note that it is
a convex optimization problem. By using Lagrange multiplier
technique, we can get the first-order necessary and sufficient
condition:
s∗i (λ) =
(√
θi
λ
− 1
)+
, (11)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the
resource constraint (9).
4Meanwhile, we note the resource constraint (9) must hold
with equality, since the objective is strictly increasing function
in si. Thus, by plugging (11) into (9), we have∑
i∈I
ni
(√
θi
λ
− 1
)+
= S. (12)
This weighted water-filling problem (where 1√
λ
can be viewed
as the water level) in general has no closed-form solution for
λ. However, we can efficiently determine the optimal solution
λ∗ by exploiting the special structure of our problem. Note
that since θ1 > · · · > θI , then λ∗ must satisfy the following
condition:
Kcp∑
i=1
ni
(√
θi
λ∗
− 1
)
= S, (13)
for a group index threshold value Kcp satisfying
θKcp
λ∗
> 1 and
θKcp+1
λ∗
≤ 1. (14)
In other words, only groups with index no larger than Kcp will
be allocated the positive resource. This property leads to the
following simple Algorithm 1 to compute λ∗ and group index
threshold Kcp: we start by assuming Kcp = I and compute λ.
If (14) is not satisfied, we decrease Kcp by one and recompute
λ until (14) is satisfied.
Algorithm 1 Solving the Resource Allocation Problem CP1
1: function CP ({ni, θi}i∈I , S)
2: k ← I , λ(k)←
(∑k
i=1 ni
√
θi
S+
∑
k
i=1 ni
)2
3: while θk ≤ λ(k) do
4: k ← k − 1, λ(k)←
(∑k
i=1 ni
√
θi
S+
∑
k
i=1 ni
)2
5: end while
6: Kcp ← k, λ∗ ← λ(k)
7: return Kcp, λ∗
8: end function
Since θ1 > λ(1) = ( n1s+n1 )
2θ1, Algorithm 1 always
converges and returns the unique values of Kcp and λ∗. The
complexity is O(I), i.e., linear in the number of user groups
(not the number of users).
With Kcp and λ∗, the solution of the resource allocation
problem can be written as
s∗i =
{ √
θi
λ∗
− 1, i = 1, . . . ,Kcp;
0, otherwise.
(15)
For the ease of discussions, we introduce a new notion of the
effective market, which denotes all the groups allocated non-
zero resource. For the resource allocation subproblemCP1, the
threshold Kcp describes the size of the effective market. All
groups with indices no larger than Kcp are effective groups,
and users in these groups as effective users. An example of
the effective market is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Now let us solve the admission control subproblem CP2.
Denote the objective (10) as Rcp(n), by (15), then Rcp(n) ∆=
Kcp∑
i=1
ni
(√
θi
λ∗(n) − 1
)√
θiλ∗(n). We first relax the integer do-
main constraint of ni as ni ∈ [0, Ni]. Since (13), by taking
group 1 group 6group 5group 4group 3group 2
Zero resource Nonzero resource
Threshold (size) of effective 
market K
cp
= 4
Willingness to pay decreasing
Effective market
Fig. 2. A 6-group example for the effective market: the willingness to pays
decrease from group 1 to group 6. The effective market threshold can be
obtained by Algorithm 1, and is 4 in this example.
the derivative of the objective function Rcp(n) with respect
to ni, we have
∂Rcp(n)
∂ni
= ni
(√
θi
λ∗(n)
− 1
)
∂
√
θiλ∗(n)
∂ni
, (16)
Also from (13), we have λ∗ =
(∑Kcp
i=i ni
√
θi
S+
∑
Kcp
i=1 ni
)2
, thus
∂
√
λ∗(n)
∂ni
> 0, for i = 1, . . . ,Kcp, and ∂
√
λ∗(n)
∂ni
= 0, for
i = Kcp + 1, . . . , I . This means that the objective Rcp(n)
is strictly increasing in ni for all i = 1, . . . ,Kcp, thus it
is optimal to admit all users in the effective market. The
admission decisions for groups not in the effective market is
irrelevant to the optimization, since those users consume zero
resource. Therefore, one of the optimal solutions of the CP1
subproblem is n∗i = Ni for all i ∈ I. Solving the CP1 and
the CP2 subproblems leads to the optimal solution of the CP
problem:
Theorem 1: There exists an optimal solution of th3 CP
problem that satisfies the following conditions:
• All users are admitted: n∗i = Ni for all i ∈ I.
• There exist a value λ∗ and a group index threshold Kcp ≤
I , such that only the top Kcp groups of users receive
positive resource allocations,
s∗i =
{ √
θi
λ∗
− 1, i = 1, . . . ,Kcp;
0, otherwise.
with the prices
p∗i =
{ √
θiλ∗, i = 1, . . . ,Kcp;
θi, otherwise.
The values of λ∗ and Kcp can be computed as in
Algorithm 1 by setting ni = Ni, for all i ∈ I.
Theorem 1 provides the right economic intuition: the service
provider maximizes its revenue by charging a higher price to
users with a higher willingness to pay. It is easy to check that
pi > pj for any i < j. The low willingness to pay users are
excluded from the markets.
C. Properties
Here we summarize some interesting properties of the
optimal complete price differentiation scheme:
1) Threshold structure: The threshold based resource allo-
cation means that higher willingness to pay groups have higher
priories of obtaining the resource at the optimal solution.
To see this clearly, assume the effective market size is K(1)
under parameters {θi, N (1)i }i∈I and S. Here the superscript
(1) denotes the first parameter set. Now consider another set
5of parameters {θi, N (2)i }i∈I and S, where N (2)i ≥ N (1)i for
each group i and the new The effective market size is K(2).
By (13), we can see that K(2) ≤ K(1). Furthermore, we can
show that if some high willingness to pay group has many
more users under the latter system parameters, i.e., N (2)i is
much larger than N (1)i for some i < K(1), then the effective
size will be strictly decreased, i.e., K(2) < K(1). In other
words, the increase of high willingness to pay users will drive
the low willingness to pay users out of the effective market.
2) Admission control with pricing: Theorem 1 shows the
explicit admission control is not necessary at the optimal solu-
tion. Also from Theorem 1, we can see that when the number
of users in any effective group increases, the price p∗i , for all
i ∈ I increases and resource s∗i , for all ∀ i ≤ Kcp decreases.
The prices serve as the indications of the scarcity of the
resources and will automatically prevent the low willingness
to pay users to consume the network resource.
IV. SINGLE PRICING SCHEME
In last section, we showed that the CP scheme is the opti-
mal pricing scheme to maximize the revenue under complete
information. However, such a complicated pricing scheme is
of high implementational complexity. In this section we study
the single pricing scheme. It is clear that the scheme will in
general suffer a revenue loss comparing with the CP scheme.
We will try to characterize the impact of various system
parameters on such revenue loss.
A. Problem Formulation and Solution
Let us first formulate the Single Pricing (SP ) problem.
SP : maximize
p≥0, n
p
∑
i∈I
nisi
subject to si =
(
θi
p
− 1
)+
, i ∈ I
ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni} , i ∈ I∑
i∈I
nisi ≤ S.
Comparing with the CP problem in Section III, here the
service provider charges a single price p to all groups of
users. After a similar transformation as in Section III, we can
show that the optimal single price satisfies the following the
weighted water-filling condition∑
i∈I
Ni
(
θi
p
− 1
)+
= S.
Thus we can obtain the following solution that shares a similar
structure as complete price differentiation.
Theorem 2: There exists an optimal solution of the SP
problem that satisfies the following conditions:
• All users are admitted: n∗i = Ni, for all i ∈ I.
• There exist a price p∗ and a group index threshold Ksp ≤
I , such that only the top Ksp groups of users receive
positive resource allocations,
s∗i =
{
θi
p∗
− 1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,Ksp,
0, otherwise,
with the price
p∗ = p(Ksp) =
∑Ksp
i=1 Niθi
S +
∑Ksp
i=1 Ni
.
The value of Ksp and p∗ can be computed as in Algo-
rithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Search the threshold of the SP problem
1: function SP ({Ni, θi}i∈I , S)
2: k ← I , p(k)←
∑
k
i=1 Niθi
S+
∑
k
i=1 Ni
3: while θk ≤ p(k) do
4: k ← k − 1, p(k)←
∑
k
i=1 Niθi
S+
∑
k
i=1 Ni
5: end while
6: Ksp ← k, p∗ ← p(k)
7: return Ksp, p∗
8: end function
B. Properties
The SP scheme shares several similar properties as the
CP scheme (Sec. III-C), including the threshold structure and
admission control with pricing. Similarly, we can define the
effective market for the SP scheme.
It is more interesting to notice the differences between these
two schemes. To distinguish solutions, we use the superscript
“cp” for the CP scheme, and “sp” for the SP scheme.
Proposition 1: Under same parameters {Ni, θi}i∈I and S:
1) The effective market of the SP scheme is no larger than
the one of the CP scheme, i.e., Ksp ≤ Kcp.
2) There exists a threshold k¯ ∈ {1, 2 . . . ,Ksp}, such that
• Groups with indices less than k¯ (high willingness
to pay users) are charged with higher prices and
allocated less resources in the CP scheme, i.e.,
pcpi ≥ p∗ and scpi ≤ sspi , ∀ i ≤ k¯, where the equality
holds if only if i = k¯ and θk¯ = p
∗2
λ∗
.
• Groups with indices greater than k¯ (low willingness
to pay users) are charged with lower prices and
allocated more resources in the CP scheme, i.e.,
pcpi < p
∗ and scpi > s
sp
i , ∀ i ≥ k¯.
Here p∗ is the optimal single price.
The proof is given in Appendix B. An illustrative example is
shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
It is easy to understand that the SP scheme makes less
revenue, since it is a feasible solution to the CP problem. A
little bit more computation sheds more light on this compar-
ison. We introduce the following notations to streamline the
comparison:
• Neff (k) ,
k∑
i=1
Ni: the number of effective users, where
k is the size of the effective market.
• γi(k) , NiNeff (k) , i = 1, 2, . . . , k: the fraction of group
i’s users in the effective market.
• s¯(k) , S
Neff (k)
: the average resource per an effective
user.
• θ¯(k) ,
k∑
i=1
γiθi: the average willingness to pay per an
effective user.
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Based on Theorem 1, the revenue of the CP scheme is
Rcp(Kcp) = Neff (K
cp)
(
s¯(Kcp)θ¯(Kcp) + g(Kcp)
s¯(Kcp) + 1
)
, (17)
where
g(Kcp) =
1
λ∗
Kcp∑
i=1
Kcp∑
j>i
γiγj(p
cp
i − pcpj )2. (18)
Based on Theorem 2, the revenue of the SP scheme is
Rsp(Ksp) = Neff (K
sp)
(
s¯(Ksp)θ¯(Ksp)
s¯(Ksp) + 1
)
. (19)
From (17) and (19), it is clear to see that Rcp ≥ Rsp due to
two factors: one is the non-negative term in (18), the other
is Kcp ≥ Ksp: a higher level of differentiation implies a no
smaller effective market. Let us further discuss them in the
following two cases:
• If Kcp = Ksp, then the additional term of (18) in (17)
means that Rcp ≥ Rsp. The equality holds if and only
if Kcp = 1, in which case g(Kcp) = 0. Note that
in this case, the CP scheme degenerates to the SP
scheme. We name the nonnegative term g(Kcp) in (18)
as price differentiation gain, as it measures the average
price difference between any effective users in the CP
scheme. The larger the price difference, the larger the
gain. When there is no differentiation in the degenerating
case (Kcp = 1), the gain is zero.
• If Kcp > Ksp, since the common part of two revenue
Neff (K)
(
s¯(K)θ¯(K)
s¯(K)+1
)
=
Sθ¯Neff (K)
S+Neff (K)
is a strictly increas-
ing function of Neff (K), price differentiation makes
more revenue even if the positive differentiation gain
g(Kcp) is not taken into consideration. This result is
intuitive: more consumers with purchasing power always
mean more revenue in the service provider’s pocket.
Finally, we note that the CP scheme in Section III requires
the complete network information. The SP scheme here, on
the other hand, works in the incomplete information case as
well. This distinction becomes important in Section VI.
V. PARTIAL PRICE DIFFERENTIATION UNDER COMPLETE
INFORMATION
For a service provider facing thousands of user types, it
is often impractical to design a price choice for each user
type. The reasons behind this, as discussed in [11], are mainly
high system overheads and customers’ aversion. However,
as we have shown in Sec. IV, the single pricing scheme
may suffer a considerable revenue loss. How to achieve a
good tradeoff between the implementational complexity and
the total revenue? In reality, we usually see that the service
provider offers only a few pricing plans for the entire users
population; we term it as the partial price differentiation
scheme. In this section, we will answer the following question:
if the service provider is constrained to maintain a limited
number of prices, p1, . . . , pJ , J ≤ I , then what is the optimal
pricing strategy and the maximum revenue? Concretely, the
Partial Price differentiation (PP ) problem is formulated as
follows.
PP : maximize
ni,pi,si,pj ,a
j
i
∑
i∈I
nipisi
subject to si =
(
θi
pi
− 1
)+
, ∀ i ∈ I, (20)
ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni}, ∀ i ∈ I, (21)∑
i∈I
nisi ≤ S, (22)
pi =
∑
j∈J
ajip
j, (23)
∑
j∈J
aji = 1, a
j
i ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ I.(24)
Here J denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , J}. Since we consider
the complete information scenario in this section, the service
provider can choose the price charged to each group, thus
constraints (20) – (22) are the same as in the CP problem.
Constraints (23) and (24) mean that pi charged to each group i
is one of J choices from the set {pj , j ∈ J }. For convenience,
we define cluster Cj ∆= {i | aji = 1}, j ∈ J , which is a set of
groups charged with the same price pj . We use superscript j to
denote clusters, and subscript i to denote groups through this
section. We term the binary variables a ∆= {aji , j ∈ J , i ∈ I}
as the partition, which determines which cluster each group
belongs to.
The PP problem is a combinatorial optimization problem,
and is more difficult than the previous CP and SP problems.
On the other hand, we notice that the PP problem formulation
includes the CP scheme (J = I) and the SP scheme scenario
(J = 1) as special cases. The insights we obtained from
solving these two special cases in Sections III and IV will
be helpful to solve the general PP problem.
7A. Three-level Decomposition
To solve the PP problem, we decompose and tackle it in
three levels. In the lowest level-3, we determine the pricing
and resource allocation for each cluster, given a fixed partition
and fixed resource allocation among clusters. In level-2, we
compute the optimal resource allocation among clusters, given
a fixed partition. In level-1, we optimize the partition among
groups.
1) Level-3: Pricing and resource allocation in each clus-
ter: For a fix partition a and a cluster resource allocation
s
∆
= {sj}j∈J , we focus the pricing and resource allocation
problems within each cluster Cj , j ∈ J :
Level-3: maximize
ni,si,pj
∑
i∈Cj
nip
jsi
subject to si =
(
θi
pj
− 1
)+
, ∀ i ∈ Cj ,
ni ≤ Ni, ∀ i ∈ Cj,∑
i∈Cj
nisi ≤ sj .
The level-3 subproblem coincides with the SP scheme dis-
cussed in Section IV, since all groups within the same cluster
Cj are charged with a single price pj . We can then directly
apply the results in Theorem 2 to solve the Level-3 problem.
We denote the effective market threshold2 for cluster Cj as
Kj , which can be computed in Algorithm 2. An illustrative
example is shown in Fig. 5, where the cluster contains four
groups (group 4, 5, 6 and 7), and the effective market contains
groups 4 and 5, thus Kj = 5. The service provider obtains
the following maximum revenue obtained from cluster Cj :
Rj(sj ,a) =
sj
∑
i∈Cj , i≤Kj Niθi
sj +
∑
i∈Cj , i≤Kj Ni
. (25)
group 4 group 7group 6group 5
Zero resource Nonzero resource
Threshold (size) of effective 
market K
j
= 5
Willingness to pay decreasing
Effective
market
A Cluster 
C
j
Fig. 5. An illustrative example of Level-3: the cluster contains four groups,
group 4, 5, 6 and 7; and the effective market contains group 4 and 5, thus
Kj = 5
2) Level-2: Resource allocation among clusters: For a fix
partition a, we then consider the resource allocation among
clusters.
Level-2: maximize
sj≥0
∑
j∈J
Rj(sj ,a)
subject to
∑
j∈J
sj ≤ S
We will show in Section V-B that subproblems in Level-
2 and Level-3 can be transformed into a complete price
2Note that we do not assume that the effective market threshold equals to
the number of effective groups, e.g., there are 2 effective groups in Fig. 5,
but threshold Kj = 5. Later we will prove that there is unified threshold
for the PP problem. Then by this result, the group index threshold actually
coincides with the number of effective groups.
differentiation problem under proper technique conditions. Let
us denote the its optimal value as Rpp(a).
3) Level-1: cluster partition: Finally, we solve the cluster
partition problem.
Level-1: maximize
a
j
i
∈{0,1}
Rpp(a)
subject to
∑
j∈J
aji = 1, i ∈ I.
This partition problem is a combinatorial optimization
problem. The size of its feasible set is S(I, J) =
1
J!
J∑
t=1
(−1)J+tC(J, t)tI , Stirling number of the second kind
[27, Chap.13], where C(J, t) is the binomial coefficient. Some
numerical examples are given in the third row in Table I. If the
number of prices J is given, the feasible set size is exponential
in the total number of groups I . For our problem, however, it is
possible to reduce the size of the feasible set by exploiting the
special problem structure. More specifically, the group indices
in each cluster should be consecutive at the optimum. This
means that the size of the feasible set is C(I − 1, J − 1) as
shown in the last row in Table I, and thus is much smaller
than S(I, J).
Next we discuss how to solve the three level subproblems.
A route map for the whole solving process is given in Fig. 6.
Cluster Partition
The CP scheme
Level 2
The SP scheme
Level 3
: pp pp
pp
K K
K p  !
Cluster Partition
Level 1
Resource allocation 
among clusters
Level 2
Pricing and resource allocation
in each cluster
Level 3
Equivalent 
Simplification
Level 1'
Fig. 6. Decomposition and simplification of the general PP problem: The
three-level decomposition structure of the PP problem is shown in the left
hand side. After simplifications in Section V-B and V-C, the problem will be
reduced to structure in right hand side.
B. Solving Level-2 and Level-3
The optimal solution (25) of the Level-3 problem can be
equivalently written as
Rj(s,a) =
sj
∑
i∈Cj , i≤Kj Niθi
sj +
∑
i∈Cj , i≤Kj Ni
(a)
=
sjN jθj
sj +N j
, (26)
where
{
N j =
∑
i∈Cj , i≤Kj Ni,
θj =
∑
i∈Cj , i≤Kj
Niθi
Nj
.
(27)
The equality (a) in (26) means that each cluster Cj can be
equivalently treated as a group with N j homogeneous users
with the same willings to pay θj . We name this equivalent
group as a super-group (SG). We summarize the above result
as the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For every cluster Cj and total resource sj ,
j ∈ J , we can find an equivalent super-group which satisfies
conditions in (27) and achieves the same revenue under the
SP scheme.
Based on Lemma 1, the level-2 and level-3 subproblems
together can be viewed as the CP problem for super-groups.
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NUMERICAL EXAMPLES FOR FEASIBLE SET SIZE OF THE PARTITION PROBLEM IN LEVEL-1
Number of groups I = 10 I = 100 I = 1000
Number of prices J = 2 J = 3 J = 2 J = 3 J = 2
S(I, J) 511 9330 6.33825 × 1029 8.58963 × 1046 5.35754 × 10300
C(I − 1, J − 1) 9 36 99 4851 999
Since a cluster and its super-group from a one-to-one mapping,
we will use the two words interchangeably in the sequel.
However, simply combining Theorems 1 and 2 to solve the
level-2 and level-3 subproblems for a fixed partition a can
result in a very high complexity. This is because the effective
markets within each super-group and between super-groups
are coupled together. An illustrative example of this coupling
effective market is shown in Fig. 7, where Kc is the threshold
between clusters and has three possible positions (i.e., between
group 2 and group 3, between group 5 and group 6, or after
group 6); and K1 and K2 are thresholds within cluster C1 and
C2, which have two or three possible positions, respectively.
Thus, there are (2×3)×3 = 18 possible thresholds possibilities
in total.
C1 (or SG1) C2 (or SG2)
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5
Zero resource Nonzero resource
K
C : Threshold for 
clusters
K1: Threshold in C1 K2: Threshold in C2
group 6
C3 (or SG3)
Fig. 7. An example of coupling thresholds.
The key idea to resolve this coupling issue is to show that
the situation in Fig. 7 can not be an optimal solution of the
PP problem. The results in Sections III and IV show that
there is a unified threshold at the optimum in both the CP
and SP cases, e.g., Fig. 2. Next we will show that a unified
single threshold also exists in the PP case.
Lemma 2: At any optimal solution of the PP scheme, the
group indices of the effective market is consecutive.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix C. The
intuition is that the resource should be always allocated to
high willingness to pay users at the optimum. Thus, it is not
possible to have Fig. 7 at an optimal solution, where high
willingness to pay users in group 2 are allocated zero resource
while low willingness to pay users in group 3 are allocated
positive resources.
Based on Lemma 2, we know that there is a unified effective
market threshold for the PP problem, denoted as Kpp. Since
all groups with indices larger than Kpp make zero contribution
to the revenue, we can ignore them and only consider the
partition problem for the first Kpp groups. Given a partition
that divides the Kpp groups into J clusters (super-groups), we
can apply the CP result in Section III to compute the optimal
revenue in Level-2 based on Theorem 1.
Rpp(a) =
J∑
j=1
N jθj −
(∑J
j=1N
j
√
θj
)2
S +
∑J
j=1N
j
=
Kpp∑
i=1
Niθi −
(∑J
j=1N
j
√
θj
)2
S +
∑Kpp
i=1 Ni
. (28)
C. Solving Level-1
1) With a given effective market threshold Kpp: Based on
the previous results, we first simplify the level-1 subproblem,
and prove the theorem below.
Theorem 3: For a given threshold Kpp, the optimal parti-
tion of Level-1 is the solution of the following optimization
problem.
Level-1′ minimize
a
j
i
,Nj ,θj
∑
j∈J
N j
√
θj
subject to N j =
∑
i∈Kpp
Nia
j
i , j ∈ J ,
θj =
∑
i∈Kpp
Nia
j
i
N j
θi j ∈ J ,∑
j∈J
aji = 1, a
j
i ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ Kpp j∈J ,
θKpp > p
J =
√
θJ (a)λ(a). (29)
where Kpp ∆= {1, 2, . . . ,Kpp}, θJ (a) is the value of average
willingness to pay of the J th group for the partition a, and
λ(a) =
(∑
j∈J
Nj
√
θj
S+
∑
Kpp
i=1 Ni
)2
.
Proof: The objective function and the first three con-
straints in Level-1′ are easy to understand: if the effective
market threshold Kpp is given, then the objective function of
the Level-1 subproblem, maximizing Rpp in (28) over a, is as
simple as minimizing
∑J
j=1N
j
√
θj as the level-1′ problem
suggested; the first three constraints are given by the definition
of the partition.
Constraint (29) is the threshold condition that supports
(28), which means that the least willingness to pay users
in the effective market has a positive demand. It ensures
that calculating the revenue by (28) is valid. Remember that
the solution of the CP problem of Level-2 and Level-3 is
threshold based, and Lemma 2 indicates that (29) is sufficient
for that all groups with willingness larger than group Kpp can
have positive demands. Otherwise, we can construct another
partition leading to a larger revenue (please refer to the proof
of Lemma 2), or equivalently leading to a less objective value
of Level-1′. This leads to a contradiction.
The level-1′ problem is still a combinatorial optimization
problem with a large feasible set of a (similar as the original
9Level-1). The following result can help us to reduce the size
of the feasible set.
Theorem 4: For any effective market size Kpp and number
of prices J , an optimal partition of the PP problem involves
consecutive group indices within clusters.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix D. We first
prove this result is true for Level-1′ without constraint (29),
and further show that this result will not affected by (29).
The intuition is that high willingness to pay users should
be allocated positive resources with priority. It implies that
groups with similar willingness to pays should be partitioned
in the same cluster, instead of in several far away clusters. Or
equivalently, the group indices within each cluster should be
consecutive.
We define A as the set of all partitions with consecutive
group indices within each cluster, and v(a) =
∑
j∈J N
j
√
θj
is the value of objective of Level-1′ for a partition a. Al-
gorithm 3 finds the optimal solution of Level-1′. The main
idea for this algorithm is to enumerate every possible partition
in set A, and then check whether the threshold condition
(29) can be satisfied. The main part of this algorithm is to
enumerate all partitions in set A of C(Kpp−1, J−1) feasible
partitions. Thus the complexity of Algorithm 3 is no more than
O((Kpp)J−1).
Algorithm 3 Solve the level-1′ problem with fixed Kpp
1: function LEVEL-1(Kpp, J)
2: k ← Kpp
3: v∗ ←
√∑k
i=1Ni
∑k
i=1Niθi, a
∗ = 0
4: for a ∈ A do
5: if θk >
√
θJ(a)λ(a) then
6: if v(a) < v∗ then
7: v∗ ← v(a), a∗ ← a
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: return a∗
12: end function
2) Search the optimal effective market threshold Kpp: We
know the optimal market threshold Kpp is upper-bounded,
i.e., Kpp ≤ Kcp ≤ I . Thus we can first run Algorithm 1 to
calculate the effective market size for the CP scheme Kcp.
Then, we search the optimal Kpp iteratively using Algorithm 3
as an inner loop. We start by letting Kpp = Kcp and run
Algorithm 3. If there is no solution, we decrease Kpp by
one and run Algorithm 3 again. The algorithm will terminate
once we find an effective market threshold where Algorithm 3
has an optimal solution. Once the optimal threshold and the
partition of the clusters are determined, we can further run
Algorithm 1 to solve the joint optimal resource allocation and
pricing scheme. The pseudo code is given in Algorithm 4 as
follows.
In Algorithm 4, it invokes two functions: CP({Niθi}i∈I ,
S) as described in Algorithm 1 and and Level-1(k, J) as in
Algorithm 3. CP({Niθi}i∈I , S) returns a vector with two
elements: CP({Ni{θi}i∈I , S) 1 denotes the first element Kcp,
Algorithm 4 Solve Partial Price Differentiation Problem
1: pi ← θi
2: k ⇐ CP({Ni, θi}i∈I , S) 1, a∗ ⇐ Level-1(k,J)
3: while a∗ == 0 do
4: k ← k − 1, a∗ ⇐ Level-1(k,J)
5: end while
6: for j ← 1, J do
7: N j ←∑ki=1Niaji , θj ←∑ki=1 NiajiNj θi
8: end for
9: λ⇐ CP({N j , θj}i∈J , S) 2
10: for i← 1, k do
11: pi ←
∑J
j=1 a
j
i
√
θjλ
12: end for
13: return {pi}i∈I
and CP({Niθi}i∈I , S) 2 denotes the second element λ∗ in the
CP problem.
The above analysis leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 5: The solution obtained by Algorithm 4 is opti-
mal for the PP problem.
Proof: It is clear that Algorithm 4 enumerates every possi-
ble value of the effective market size for the PP problem Kpp,
and for a given Kpp its inner loop Algorithm 3 enumerates
every possible partition in set A. Therefore, the result in
Theorem 4 follows.
Next we discuss the complexity of Algorithm 4. The
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(I), and we run it twice in
Algorithm 4. The worst case complexity of Algorithm 3 is
O(IJ−1), and we run it no more than I − J times. Thus the
whole complexity of Algorithm 4 is no more than O(IJ ),
which is polynomial of I .
VI. PRICE DIFFERENTIATION UNDER INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
In Sections III, IV, and V, we discuss various pricing
schemes with different implementational complexity level un-
der complete information, the revenues of which can be viewed
as the benchmark of practical pricing designs. In this section,
we further study the incomplete information scenario, where
the service provider does not know the group association of
each user. The challenge for pricing in this case is that the
service provider needs to provide the right incentive so that a
group i user does not want to pretend to be a user in a different
group. It is clear that the CP scheme in Section III and the PP
scheme in Section V cannot be directly applied here. The SP
scheme in Section IV is a special case, since it does not require
the user-group association information in the first place and
thus can be applied in the incomplete information scenario
directly. On the other hand, we know that the SP scheme
may suffer a considerable revenue loss compared with the
CP scheme. Thus it is natural to ask whether it is possible to
design an incentive compatible differentiation scheme under
incomplete information. In this section, we design a quantity-
based price menu to incentivize users to make the right self-
selection and to achieve the same maximum revenue of the
CP scheme under complete information with proper technical
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conditions. We name it as the Incentive Compatible Complete
Price differentiation (ICCP ) scheme.
In the ICCP scheme, the service provider publishes a
quantity-based price menu, which consists of several step
functions of resource quantities. Users are allowed to freely
choose their quantities. The aim of this price menu is to make
the users self-differentiated, so that to mimic the same result
(the same prices and resource allocations) of the CP scheme
under complete information. Based on Theorem 1, there are
only K (without confusion, we remove the superscript “cp”
to simplify the notation) effective groups of users receiving
non-zero resource allocations, thus there are K steps of unit
prices, p∗1 > p∗2 > · · · > p∗K in the price menu. These prices
are exactly the same optimal prices that the service provider
would charge for K effective groups as in Theorem 1. Note
that for the K+1, . . . , I groups, all the prices in the menu are
too high for them, then they will still demand zero resource.
The quantity is divided into K intervals by K − 1 thresholds,
s1th > s
2
th > · · · > sK−1th . The ICCP scheme can specified
as follows:
p(s) =


p∗1 when s > s
1
th
p∗2 when s
1
th ≥ s > s2th
.
.
.
p∗K when s
K−1
th ≥ s > 0.
(30)
A four-group example is shown in Fig. 8.
s
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Fig. 8. A four-group example of the ICCP scheme: where the prices
p∗
1
> p∗
2
> p∗
3
> p∗
4
are the same as the CP scheme. To mimic the same
resource allocation as under the CP scheme, one necessary (but not sufficient)
condition is sj−1
th
≥ s∗j for all j, where s∗j is the optimal resource allocation
of the CP scheme.
Note that in contrast to the usual “volume discount”, here
the price is non-decreasing in quantity. This is motivated by
the resource allocation in Theorem 1, that a user with a higher
θi is charged a higher price for a larger resource allocation.
Thus the observable quantity can be viewed as an indication of
the unobservable users’ willingness to pay, and help to realize
price differentiation under incomplete information.
The key challenge in the ICCP scheme is to properly set
the quantity thresholds so that users are perfectly segmented
through self-differentiation. This is, however, not always pos-
sible. Next we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions
to guarantee the perfect segmentation.
Let us first study the self-selection problem between two
groups: group i and group q with i < q. Later on we
will generalize the results to multiple groups. Here group i
has a higher willingness to pay, and will be charged with
a higher price p∗i in the CP case. The incentive compatible
constraint is that a high willingness to pay user can not get
more surplus by pretending to be a low willingness to pay
user, i.e., max
s
Ui(s; p
∗
i ) ≥ max
s
Ui(s; p
∗
q), where Ui(s; p) =
θi ln(1 + s) − ps is the surplus of a group i user when it is
charged with price p.
Without confusion, we still use s∗i to denote the optimal
resource allocation under the optimal prices in Theorem 1,
i.e., s∗i = argmax
si≥0
Ui(si; p
∗
i ). We define si→q as the quantity
satisfying {
Ui(si→q; p∗q) = Ui(s
∗
i ; p
∗
i )
si→q < s∗i
. (31)
In other words, when a group i user is charged with a lower
price p∗q and demands resource quantity si→q , it achieves the
same as the maximum surplus under the optimal price of the
CP scheme p∗i , as showed in Fig. 9. Since the there two
solutions of the first equation of (31), we constraint si→q to
be the one that is smaller than s∗i .
ΘilnH1+sL-p*q s
resource
surplus
ΘilnH1+sL-p*i  s
si®q s
*
i
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Fig. 9. When the threshold sq−1
th
< si→q , the group i user can not obtain
U(s∗i , p
∗
i ) if it chooses the lower price pq at a quantity less than s
q−1
th
.
Therefore it will automatically choose the high price p∗i to maximize its
surplus.
To maintain the group i users’ incentive to choose the higher
price p∗i instead of p∗q , we must have s
q−1
th ≤ si→q , which
means a group i user can not obtain Ui(s∗i , p∗i ) if it chooses a
quantity less than sq−1th . In other words, it will automatically
choose the higher (and the desirable) price p∗i to maximize
its surplus. On the other hand, we must have sq−1th ≥ s∗q in
order to maintain the optimal resource allocation and allow a
group q user to choose the right quantity-price combination
(illustrated in Fig. 8).
Therefore, it is clear that the necessary and sufficient con-
dition that the ICCP scheme under incomplete information
achieves the same maximum revenue of the CP scheme under
complete information is
s∗q ≤ si→q, ∀ i < q, ∀ q ∈ {2, . . . ,K}. (32)
By solving these inequalities, we can obtain the following
theorem (detailed proof in Appendix E).
Theorem 6: There exist unique thresholds {t1, . . . ,tK−1},
such that the ICCP scheme achieves the same maximum
revenue as in the complete information case if√
θq
θq+1
≥ tq for q=1, . . . ,K − 1.
Moreover, tq is the unique solution of the equation
t2 ln t− (t2 − 1) + t
∑q
k=1Nk +Nq+1
S +
∑Kcp
k=1Nk
(t− 1) = 0
over the domain t > 1.
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We want to mention that the condition in Theorem 6 is
necessary and sufficient for the case of K = 2 effective
groups3. For K > 2, Theorem 6 is sufficient but not necessary.
The intuition of Theorem 6 is that users need to be sufficiently
different to achieve the maximum revenue.
The following result immediately follows Theorem 6.
Corollary 1: The tqs in Theorem 6 satisfy tq < troot for
q = 1, . . . ,K − 1, where troot ≈ 2.21846 is the larger root of
equation t2 ln t− (t2 − 1) = 0.
The Corollary 1 means that the users do not need to be
extremely different to achieve the maximum revenue.
When the conditions in Theorem 6 are not satisfied, there
may be revenue loss by using the pricing menu in (30). Since
it is difficult to explicitly solve the parameterized transcend
equation (31), we are not able to characterize the loss in a
closed form yet.
A. Extensions to Partial Price Differentiation under Incom-
plete Information
For any given system parameters, we can numerically check
whether a partial price differentiation scheme can achieve
the same maximum revenue under both the complete and
incomplete information scenarios. The idea is similar as we
described in this section. Since the PP problem can be viewed
as the CP problem for all effective super-groups, then we
can check the ICCP bound in Theorem 6 for super-groups
(once the super-group partition is determined by the searching
using Algorithm 4). Deriving an analytical sufficient condition
(as in Theorem 6) for an incentive compatible partial price
differentiation scheme, however, is highly non-trivial and is
part of our future study.
VII. CONNECTIONS WITH THE CLASSICAL PRICE
DIFFERENTIATION TAXONOMY
In economics, price differentiation is often categorized by
the first/second/third degree price differentiation taxonomy
[28]. This taxonomy is often used in the context of unlim-
ited resources and general pricing functions. The proposed
schemes in our paper have several key differences from these
standard concepts, mainly due to the assumption of limited
total resources and the choice of linear usage-based pricing.
In the first-degree price differentiation, each user is charged
a price based on its willingness to pay. Such a scheme is
also called the perfect price differentiation, as it captures
users’ entire surpluses (i.e., leaving users with zero payoffs).
For the complete price differentiation scheme under complete
information in Section III, the service provider does not extract
all surpluses from users, mainly due to the choice of linear
price functions. All effective users obtain positive payoffs.
In the second-degree price differentiation, prices are set
according to quantities sold (e.g., the volume discount). The
pricing scheme under incomplete information in Section VI
has a similar flavor of quantity-based charging. However,
our proposed pricing scheme charges a higher unit price for
a larger quantity purchase, which is opposite to the usual
3There might be other groups who are not allocated positive resource under
the optimal pricing.
practice of volume discount. This is due to our motivation of
mimicking the optimal pricing differentiation scheme under
the complete information. Our focus is to characterize the
sufficient conditions, under which the revenue loss due to
incomplete information (also called “information rent” [7]–
[9], [29]) is zero.
In the third-degree price differentiation, prices are set ac-
cording to some customer segmentation. The segmentation is
usually made based on users’ certain attributes such as ages,
occupations, and genders. The partial price differentiation
scheme in Section V is analogous to the third-degree price
differentiation, but here the user segmentation is still based on
users’ willingness to pay. The motivation of our scheme is to
reduce the implementational complexity.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We provide numerical examples to quantitatively study
several key properties of price differentiation strategies in this
section.
A. When is price differentiation most beneficial?
Definition 1: (Revenue gain) We define the revenue gain G
of one pricing scheme as the ratio of the revenue difference
(between this pricing scheme and the single pricing scheme)
normalized by the revenue of single pricing scheme.
In this subsection, we will study the revenue gain of the
CP scheme, i.e., G(N , θ, S) ∆= Rcp−Rsp
Rsp
, where N ∆=
{Ni, ∀i ∈ I} denotes the number of users in each groups,
θ
∆
= {θi, ∀i ∈ I} denotes their willingness to pays, and S
is the total resource. Notice that this gain is the maximum
possible differentiation gain among all PP schemes.
We first study a simple two-group case. According to
Theorems 1 and 2, the revenue under the SP scheme and
the CP scheme can be calculated as follows:
Rsp =


S(N1θ1+N2θ2)
N1+N2+S
, 1 ≤ t <
√
S+N1
N1
;
SN1θ1
N1+S
, t ≥
√
S+N1
N1
;
and
Rcp =
{
S(N1θ1+N2θ2)+N1N2(
√
θ1−
√
θ2)
2
N1+N2+S
, 1 ≤ t < S+N1
N1
;
SN1θ1
N1+S
t ≥ S+N1
N1
.
where t =
√
θ1
θ2
> 1.
The revenue gain will depend on five parameters, S, N1,
θ1, N2 and θ2. To simplify notations, let N = N1+N2 be the
total number of the users, α = N1
N
the percentage of group 1
users, and s¯ = S
N
the level of normalized available resource.
Thus the revenue gain can be expressed as
G(t, α, s¯) =


α(1−α)(t−1)2
s¯(1+α(t2−1)) 1 < t <
√
s¯+α
α
,
(1−α)(s¯+α−tα)2
αs¯(1+s¯)t2
√
s¯+α
α
≤ t ≤ s¯+α
α
.
(33)
Next we discuss the impact of each parameter.
Observation 1: In terms of the parameter t, G
monotonically increases in
(
1,
√
s¯+α
α
)
and decrease
in
(√
k+α
α
, k+α
α
)
. The maximum is obtained at
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Fig. 10. One example of the revenue gain G(t, 0.01, 0.2) for the CP
scheme. It is clear that the revenue gain can be divided into three regions.
Region(1), increasing region, where Kcp = Ksp = 2, and the revenue
gain comes from the differentiation gain. Region(2), decreasing region, where
Kcp = 2, Ksp = 1, and the revenue gain comes from larger effective market
and differentiation gain. Region(3), zero region, where Kcp = Ksp = 1, and
is a degenerating case where two pricing scheme coincide.
tG−max =
√
k+α
α
, when the resource allocated to the
group 2 user just becomes zero in the SP scheme.
One example is showed in Fig.10.
It is clear that the revenue gain is not monotonic in the
willingness to pay ratio. Its behavior can be divided into three
regions: the increasing Region (1) with t ∈
(
1,
√
s¯+α
α
)
, the
decreasing Region (2) with t ∈
[√
k+α
α
, k+α
α
)
, and the zero
Region (3) with t ≥ k+α
α
.
It is also interesting to note that three regions are closed
related to the effective market sizes: Ksp = Kcp = 2 in
Region (1); Ksp = 1 and Kcp = 2 in Region (2); and Kcp =
Ksp = 1 in Region (3) where the CP scheme degenerates to
the SP scheme. The peak point of the revenue gain correspond
to the place where the effective market of the SP Scheme
changes.
Intuitively, the CP scheme increases the revenue by charg-
ing the high willingness groups with high prices, thus the
revenue gain increases first when the difference of willingness
to pays increase. However, when the difference of willingness
to pay is very large, the CP scheme obtain most revenue
from the high willingness to pay users, while the SP scheme
declines the low willingness to pay users but serves the high
willingness to pays only. Both schemes lead to similar resource
allocation in this region, and thus the revenue gain decreases
as the difference of willingness to pays increases.
Figure 10 shows the revenue gain under usage-based pricing
can be very high in some scenario, e.g., over 50% in this
example. We can define this peak revenue gain as
Gmax(α, s¯)=max
t≥1
G(t, α, s¯)=
(α−1)(√s¯+α−√α)2
s¯(1 + s¯)
.
Figure 11 is shown how Gmax changes in s¯ with different
parameters α.
Observation 2: For a fixed s¯, Gmax(α, s¯) monotonically
decreases in α .
When α is small, which means high willingness to pay users
are minorities in the effective market, the advantage of price
differentiation is very evident. As shown in Fig. 11, when α =
0.1, the maximum possible revenue gain can be over than 20%;
and when α = 0.01, this gain can be even higher than 50%.
20 40 60 80 100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1 2 3 4 5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
GmaxHΑ, sL
Α=0.01
Α=0.1
Α=0.5
Α=0.9
s
s
GmaxHΑ, sL
Fig. 11. For a fixed s¯, Gmax(α, s¯) monotonically increases in α. For a
fixed α, Gmax(α, s¯) first increases in s¯, and then decreases in s¯.
However, when high willingness to pay users are majority, the
price differentiation gain is very limited, for example, the gain
is no larger than 8% and 2% for α = 0.5 and 0.9, respectively.
Intuitively, high willingness to pay users are the most
profitable users in the market. Ignoring them is detrimental
in terms of revenue even if they only occupy a small fraction
of the population. Since the SP scheme is set based on the
average willingness to pay of the effective market, the high
willingness to pay users will be ignored (in the sense of not
charging the desirable high price) when α is small. In contrast,
ignoring the low willingness to pay users when α is large is
not a big issue.
Observation 3: For parameter k, Gmax(α, s¯) is not a mono-
tonic function in s¯. Its shape looks like a skewed bell. The gain
is either small when s¯ is very small or very large.
Small s¯ means that resource is very limited, and both
schemes allocates the resource to high willingness to pay users
(see the discussion of the threshold structure in Sections III
and IV), and thus there is not much difference between two
pricing schemes. While s¯ is very large, i.e., the resource
is abundant, the prices and the resource allocation with or
without differentiation become similar (which can be easily
checked from formulations in Theorems 1 and 2). In these two
scenarios, similar resource allocations lead to similar revenues.
These explains the bell shape for parameter s¯.
Based on the above observations, we find that the revenue
gain can be very high under two conditions. First, the high
willingness to pay users are minorities in the effective market.
Second, the total resource is comparatively limited.
For cases with three or more groups, the analytical study
becomes much more challenging due to many more parame-
ters. Moreover, the complex threshold structure of the effective
market makes the problem even complicated. We will present
some numerical studies to illustrate some interesting insights.
For illustration convenience, we choose a three-group ex-
ample and three different sets of parameters as shown in
Table II. To limit the dimension of the problem, we set the
parameters such that the total number of users and the average
willingness to pay (i.e., θ¯ = ∑3i=1Niθi/(∑3i=1Ni)) of all
users are the same across three different parameter settings.
This ensures that the SP scheme achieves the same revenue
in three different cases when resource is abundant. Figure 12
illustrates how the differentiation gain changing changes in
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resource S.
TABLE II
PARAMETER SETTINGS OF A THREE-GROUP EXAMPLE
θ1 N1 θ2 N2 θ3 N3 θ¯
Case 1 9 10 3 10 1 80 2
Case 2 3 33 2 33 1 34 2
Case 3 2.2 80 1.5 10 1 10 2
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Fig. 12. An example of the revenue gain of a three-group market with
the same average willingness to pay
Similar as the analytical study of the two-group case, Fig. 12
shows that the revenue gain is large only when the high
willingness to pay users are minorities (e.g. case 1) in the
effective market and the resource is limited but not too small
(100 ≤ S ≤ 150 in all three cases). When resource S is large
enough (e.g., ≥ 150), the gain will gradually diminish to zero
as the resource increases. For each curve in Fig. 12, there
are two peak points. Each peak point represents a change of
the effective market threshold in the SP scheme, i.e., when
the resource allocation to a group becomes zero. In numerical
studies of networks with I > 3 groups (not shown in this
paper), we have observed the similar conditions for achieving
a large differentiation gain and the phenomenon of I−1 peak
points.
B. What is the best tradeoff of Partial Price Differentiation?
In Section V, we design Algorithm 4 that optimally solves
the PP problem with a polynomial complexity. Here we
study the tradeoff between total revenue and implementational
complexity.
To illustrate the tradeoff, we consider a five-group example
with parameters shown in Table III. Note that high willingness
to pay users are minorities here. Figure 13 shows the revenue
gain G as a function of total resource S under different PP
schemes (including CP scheme as a special case), and Fig. 14
shows how the effective market thresholds change with the
total resource.
TABLE III
PARAMETER SETTING OF A FIVE-GROUP EXAMPLE
group index i 1 2 3 4 5
θi 16 8 4 2 1
Ni 2 3 5 10 80
We enlarge Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 within the range of S ∈
[0, 50], which is the most complex and interesting part due to
several peak points. Similar as Fig. 12, we observe I − 1 = 4
peak points for each curve in Fig. 13. Each peak point again
represents a change of effective market threshold of the single
pricing scheme, as we can easily verify by comparing Fig. 14
with Fig. 13.
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Fig. 13. Revenue gain of a five-group example under different price
differentiation schemes
10 20 30 40 50
2
3
4
5
100 200 300 400 500
2
3
4
5
Threshold of the effective market
S
S
21 22 23 24 25
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
S
Two Prices
Three Prices
Four Prices
Five Prices
Single Price
Fig. 14. Corresponding thresholds of effective markets of Fig. 13’s example
As the resource S increases from 0, all gains in Fig. 13
first overlap with each other, then the two-price scheme (blue
curve) separates from the others at S = 3.41, after that the
three-price scheme (purple curve) separates at S = 8.89, and
finally the four-price scheme (dark yellow curve) separates at
near S = 20.84. These phenomena are due to the threshold
structure of the PP scheme. When the resource is very
limited, the effective markets under all pricing scheme include
only one group with the highest willingness to pay, and all
pricing schemes coincide with the SP scheme. As the resource
increases, the effective market enlarges from two groups to
finally five groups. The change of the effective market thresh-
old can be directly observed in Fig. 14. Comparing across
different curves in Fig. 14, we find that the effective market
size is non-decreasing with the number of prices for the same
resource S. This agrees with our intuition in Section IV-B,
which states that the size of effective market indicates the
degree of differentiation.
Figure 13 provides the service provider a global picture of
choosing the most proper pricing scheme according to achieve
the desirable financial target under a certain parameter setting.
For example, if the total resource S = 100, the two-price
scheme seems to be a sweet spot, as it achieves a differential
gain of 14.8% comparing to the SP scheme and is only 2.4%
worse than the CP scheme with five prices.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the revenue-maximizing problem
for a monopoly service provider under both complete and
incomplete network information. Under complete information,
our focus is to investigate the tradeoff between the total
revenue and the implementational complexity (measured in
the number of pricing choices available for users). Among
the three pricing differentiation schemes we proposed (i.e.,
complete, single, and partial), the partial price differentiation
is the most general one and includes the other two as special
cases. By exploiting the unique problem structure, we designed
an algorithm that computes the optimal partial pricing scheme
in polynomial time, and numerically quantize the tradeoff
between implementational complexity and total revenue. Un-
der incomplete information, designing an incentive-compatible
differentiation pricing scheme is difficult in general. We show
that when the users are significantly different, it is possible to
design a quantity-based pricing scheme that achieves the same
maximum revenue as under complete information.
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APPENDIX
A. Complete Price Differentiation under complete information
with General Utility Functions
In this section, we extend the solution of complete price
differentiation problem to general form of increasing and
concave utility functions ui(si). We denote Ri(si) as the
revenue collected from one user in group i. Based on the
stackelberg model, the prices satisfy pi = u′i(si), si ≥ 0 i ∈ I,
thus
Ri(si) = u
′
i(si)si, si ≥ 0. (34)
Therefore, we can rewrite the Complete Price differentiation
problem with General utility function (CPG) as follows.
CPG : maximize
s≥0,n
∑
i∈I
niRi(si)
subject to ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni} , i ∈ I (35)∑
i∈I
nisi ≤ S (36)
By similar solving technique in Sec. III of the revised
paper, we can solve the CPG problem by decomposing it into
two subproblems: resource allocation subproblem CPG1, and
admission control subproblem CPG2. In subproblem CPG1,
for given n, we solve
CPG1 : maximize
s≥0
∑
i∈I
niRi(si)
subject to
∑
i∈I
nisi ≤ S
After solving the optimal resource allocation s∗i (n), i ∈ I, we
further solve admission control subproblem:
CPG2 : maximize
n
∑
i∈I
niRi(s
∗
i (n))
subject to : ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni}.
We are especially interested in the case that constraint (36)
is active in the CPG problem, which means the resource
bound is tight in the considered problem; otherwise, the CPG
problem degenerates to a revenue maximization without any
bounded resource constraint. We can prove the following
results.
Proposition 2: If the resource constraint (36) is active in
the optimal solution of the CPG problem (or the CPG1
subproblem), then one of optimal solutions of the CPG2
subproblem is
n∗i = Ni, i ∈ I. (37)
Proof: We first release the variable ni to real number, and
calculate the first derivative as follows:
∂Ri
∂ni
= Ri(s
∗
i ) + ni
∂Ri(s
∗
i )
∂si
∂s∗i
∂ni
, i ∈ I. (38)
Plugging (34), R′i(si) = u′′i (si) si + u′i(si), and we have
∂Ri
∂ni
= u′i(s
∗
i )
(
s∗i + ni
∂s∗i
∂ni
)
+ ni u
′′
i (s
∗
i ) s
∗
i
∂s∗i
∂ni
, i ∈ I.
(39)
Since the resource constraint (36) is active in the optimal
solution of the CPG1 subproblem, that is,
∑
i∈I
nisi = S, by
taking derivative of ni in both sides of it, we have:
s∗i + ni
∂s∗i
∂ni
= 0. (40)
Substituting (40) into (39), since we assume the utility
function ui(si) is increasing and concave function, then we
have
∂Ri
∂ni
= −u′′i (s∗i ) s∗i 2 ≥ 0, i ∈ K. (41)
Thus we can conclude that one of optimal solutions for the
CPG2 subproblem is n∗i = Ni, i ∈ I.
Proposition 2 points out that when the resource constraint
(36) is active, the CPG problem can be greatly simplified: its
solution can be obtained by solving the CPG subproblem with
parameters ni = Ni, i = 1, . . . , I . The following proposition
provides a sufficient condition that the resource constraint (36)
is active.
Proposition 3: If u′′i (si)si+ui(si) > 0, si ≥ 0, i ∈ I, then
the resource constraint is active at the optimal solution.
Proof: Let λ and µi, i ∈ I, be the Lagrange multiplier of
constraint (36) and si ≥ 0, i ∈ I respectively, thus the KKT
conditions of the CGP1 subproblem is given as follows:
ni
∂Ri(s
∗
i )
∂si
− niλ∗ + µ∗i = 0, i ∈ I;
λ∗
(∑
i∈I
nis
∗
i − S
)
= 0;
µ∗i s
∗
i = 0;
λ∗ ≥ 0;
µ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ I;
s∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ I.
We denote K := {i | s∗i > 0}, and K¯ := {i | s∗i = 0}.
For i ∈ K:
∂Ri(s
∗
i )
∂si
= λ∗, i ∈ I; (42)
λ∗
(∑
i∈K
nis
∗
i − S
)
= 0. (43)
For i ∈ K¯:
∂Ri(0)
∂si
≤ λ∗, i ∈ I; (44)
Since u′′i (si)si + ui(si) > 0, si ≥ 0, i ∈ I and (42), we
have
λ∗ =
∂Ri(s
∗
i )
∂si
= u′′i (s
∗
i )s
∗
i + ui(s
∗
i ) > 0.
By (43), we must have∑i∈I nis∗i−S = 0, that the resource
constraint is active at the optimal solution.
Next, let us discuss how to calculate the optimal solution. To
guarantee uniqueness resource allocation solution, we assume
that revenue in is a strictly concave function of the demand4,
i.e., ∂
2Ri(si)
∂s2
i
< 0, i ∈ I. Thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7: If ∂
2Ri(si)
∂s2
i
< 0, i ∈ I, then there exists an
optimal solution of the CGP problem as follows:
• All users are admitted: n∗i = Ni for all i ∈ I.
4This assumption has been frequently used in the revenue management
literature [26].
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• There exist a value λ∗ and a group index threshold Kcp ≤
I , such that only the top Kcp groups of users receive
positive resource allocations,
s∗i =
{
∂Ri
∂si
−1
(λ∗), i ∈ K ;
0, otherwise.
(45)
where values of λ∗ and effective market K can be
computed as in Algorithm 5.
In Algorithm 5, we use notation f−1 denotes its in-
verse function, and rearrange the group index satisfying
∂R(1)
∂s(1)
−1
(0) ≥ ∂R(2)
∂s(2)
−1
(0) ≥ · · · ≥ ∂R(I)
∂s(I)
−1
(0).
Algorithm 5 Search the threshold for general utility function
1: k ← I , λ← ∂R(k)
∂s(k)
−1
(0)
2: while
k∑
i=1
n(i)
(
∂R(i)
∂s(i)
−1
(λ)
)+
≥ S, do
3: k ← k − 1
4: λ← ∂R(k)
∂s(k)
−1
(0)
5: end while
6: Return K = {(1), (2), . . . , (k)}
Remark 2: The complexity of Algorithm 5 is also O(I),
i.e., linear in the number of user groups (not the number of
users).
Remark 3: There are several functions satisfying the tech-
nical conditions in Theorem 7, e.g., the standard α-fairness
functions
ui(si) =
{
(1− α)−1s1−αi , 0 ≤ α < 1;
log si, α = 1.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: We first focus on the key water-filling problems
that we solve for the two pricing schemes (the CP scheme on
the LHS and the SP scheme on the RHS):∑
i∈I
Ni
(√
θi
λ∗
− 1
)+
= S =
∑
i∈I
Ni
(
θi
p∗
− 1
)+
(46)
Let θ = p
∗2
λ∗
be the solution of the equation of
√
θ
λ∗
= θ
p∗
.
By comparing it with θi, i ∈ I, there are three cases:
• Case 1:
θ > θ1 ⇒
√
θi
λ∗
=
√
θi
√
θ
p∗
> θi
p∗
, ∀ i ∈ I.
This case can not be possible. Since if every term in the
left summation is strictly larger than its counterpart in the
right summation, then (46) can not hold.
• Case 2: θI ≥ θ ⇒
√
θi
λ∗
=
√
θi
√
θ
p∗
≤ θi
p∗
, ∀ i ∈ I.
Similarly as Case 1, it can not hold, either.
• Case 3: ∃ k, s.t. 1 ≤ k < I and θk ≥ θ ≥ θk+1
⇒


√
θi
λ∗
=
√
θi
√
θ
p∗
≤ θi
p∗
, i = 1, 2, . . . , k;︸ ︷︷ ︸
The equality holds only when θ = θk and i = k.
√
θi
λ∗
=
√
θi
√
θ
p∗
≥ θi
p∗
, i = k + 1, . . . , I.︸ ︷︷ ︸
The equality holds only when θ = θk+1 and i = k + 1.
Similar argument as the above two case, we have Kcp ≥
k and Ksp ≥ k, otherwise (46) can not hold. Further,
Kcp ≥ Ksp, since if θKsp
p∗
−1 > 0, then
√
θKcp
λ∗
−1 > 0.
By Theorems 1 and 2, we prove the proposition.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
We can first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Suppose an effective market of the single pricing
scheme is denoted as K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. If we add a new
group v of Nv users with θv > θK , then the revenue strictly
increases.
Proof: We denote the single price before joining group v
is p, the price after joining group v is p′, the effective market
become K′. By Theorem 2, we have
p =
∑K
i=1Niθi
S +
∑K
i=1Ni
with θK > p and θK+1 ≤ p.
Since the optimal revenue is obtained by selling out the total
resource S, thus to prove the total revenue strictly increases if
and only if we can prove p′ > p. We consider the following
two cases.
• If after group v joining in, the new effective market
satisfies K′ = K ∪ {v}, then we have
p′ =
∑K
i=1Niθi +Nvθv
S +
∑K
i=1Ni +Nv
.
Since θv > θK > p, we have p′ > p, due to the following
simple fact.
Fact 1: For any a1, b1, a2, b2 > 0, the following two
inequality are equivalent:
a1
b1
≥ a2
b2
⇔ a1
b1
≥ a1 + a2
b1 + b2
≥ a2
b2
. (47)
• If after group v joining in, the new effective market
shrinks, namely, K′ ⊂ K ∪ {v}, K′ 6= K ∪ {v}, then
we have p′ > θK > p.
By the above Lemma 3, we further prove Lemma 2.
Proof: We prove Lemma 2 by contradiction. Suppose that
the group indices of the effective market under the optimal
partition a is not consecutive. Suppose that group i is not an
effective group, and there exists some group j, j > i, which is
an effective group. We consider a new partition a′ by putting
group i into the cluster to which group j belongs, and keeping
other groups unchanged. According to Lemma 3, the revenue
under partition a′ is greater than that under partition a, thus
partition a is not optimal. This contradicts to our assumption
and thus completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
For convenience, we use the notation (· · · ∪ · · · | · · · ∪
· · · | · · · ) to denote a partition with the groups between bars
connected with “∪” representing a cluster, e.g., three parti-
tions for J = 2,Kpp = 3 are (1|2 ∪ 3), (1 ∪ 2 | 3) and
(1 ∪ 3 | 2). In addition, we introduce the compound group to
simplify the notation of complex clusters with multiple groups.
A cluster containing group i can be simply represented as
Pre(i) ∪ i ∪ Post(i), where Pre(i) (or Post(i)) refers as a
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compound group composing of all the groups with willingness
to pay larger (or smaller) than that of group i in the cluster.
Note that the compound groups can be empty in certain cases.
Before we prove the general case in Theorem 4, we first
prove the results is true for the following two special cases in
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Lemma 4: For a three-group effective market with two
prices, i.e., Kpp = 3, J = 2, an optimal partition involves
consecutive group indices within clusters.
Proof: There are three partitions for Kpp = 3, J = 2,
and only (1 ∪ 3 | 2) is with discontinuous group index within
clusters. To show our result, we only need to prove one of
partitions with group consecutive is better than (1∪ 3 | 2). We
have two main steps in this proof, first we prove this result is
true for PP problem without consider Constraint (29). Further,
we show that Constraint (29) will not affect the optimality of
partitions with consecutive group indices within each cluster.
Step 1: (Without Constraint (29))
Without considering Constraint (29), we want show that
a1 = (1 ∪ 2 | 3) is always better than a2 = (1 ∪ 3 | 2).
Mathematically, what we try to prove is:
v(a2) > v(a1). (48)
where v(a2) = (N1 + N3)
√
N1θ1+N3θ3
N1+N3
+ N2
√
θ2, and
v(a1) = (N1 + N2)
√
N1θ1+N2θ2
N1+N2
+ N3
√
θ3. With the new
notation
∆V (i, j) := (Ni +Nj)
√
Niθi +Njθj
Ni +Nj
−Ni
√
θi −Nj
√
θj ,
it is easy to see that (48) is equivalent to the following
inequality:
∆V (1, 3) > ∆V (1, 2). (49)
We prove the inequality (49) by considering the following
two cases.
a) If N1 ≤ N2, we define a function of x as follows,
g(j;x) :=(Nj+N1)
√
Njθj+N1(θj+x)
Nj +N1
−N1
√
θj+x−Nj
√
θj .
It is easy to check that
g(j;x)|x=θ1−θj = ∆V (1, j), and g(j;x)|x=0 = 0;
and if x > 0, then
g′(j;x)=
∂g(j;x)
∂x
=
N1
2

 1√
Njθj+N1(θj+x)
Nj+N1
− 1√
θj + x

>0,
and ∂g
′(j;x)
∂θj
=
N1
4

 1
(θj + x)1.5
− 1(
Njθj+N1(θj+x)
Nj+N1
)
1.5

<0.
Since θ2 > θ3, it immediately follows that
g′(3;x) ≥ N1
2

 1√
N3θ2+N1(θ2+x)
N1+N3
− 1√
θ2 + x

 ,
Since N2 ≥ N1, then we have
g′(3;x) ≥ N1
2

 1√
N3θ2+N1(θ2+x)
N1+N3
− 1√
θ2 + x

≥ g′(2;x),
Thus, it follows
∆V (1, 3) =
∫ θ1−θ3
0
g′(3;x)dx >
∫ θ1−θ2
0
g′(2;x)dx = ∆V (1, 2),
i.e., (49) is obtained.
Let us see a special case of (49). When N1 = N2, then
∆V (1, 2)=(N1+N1)
√
N1θ2+N1θ1
N1 +N1
−N1
√
θ1−N1
√
θ2,
then we have
∆V (1, 3)>(N1+N1)
√
N1θ2+N1θ1
N1 +N1
−N1
√
θ1−N1
√
θ2. (50)
Notice that although (50) is defined with the assumption that
N1 ≤ N2, it also holds for the case N1 > N2 as (50) does
not contain the parameter N2. This result will be used in the
proof later.
b) If N1 > N2, we define a function of m as
f(m) := (N1 +m)
√
N1θ1 +mθ2
N1 +m
−N1
√
θ1 −m
√
θ2.
It is easy to obtain that
df(m)
dm
=
(√
N1θ1+mθ2
N1+m
−√θ2
)2
2
√
N1θ1+mθ2
N1+m
> 0,
i.e., the function f is an increasing function of m.
Thus it follows that
∆V (1, 2) = f(N2) < f(N1)
(a)
< ∆V (1, 3),
where (a) results from (50), the right hand side of which is
equal to f(N1).
Step 2: (Checking Constraint (29))
We want to prove that a1 satisfying Constraint (29) is the
sufficient condition of a2 satisfying (29).
Consider if a1 does not satisfy (29), it means√
θ3 ≤
√
λ(a1) =
√
v(a1)
S +
∑3
i=1Ni
.
By the result in Step 1, we know that v(a1) < v(a2), then
we have √
θ3 <
√
λ(a2) =
√
v(a2)
S +
∑3
i=1Ni
,
and further
θ3 <
√
θ3λ(a2) <
√
N3θ3 +N1θ1
N1 +N3
λ(a2) =
√
θ1λ(a2).
It means a2 can not satisfy (29) either. Thus we see that
constraint (29) actually does not affect the result in Step 1.
In conclusion, we show that in a simple case with Kpp = 3,
J = 2, an optimal partition involves consecutive group indices
within clusters.
Further, based on Lemma 4 we prove another simple special
case.
Lemma 5: For a four-group effective market with two
prices, i.e., Kpp = 4, J = 2, an optimal partition involves
consecutive group indices within clusters.
Proof: For Kpp = 4 and J = 2 case, there are total seven
possible partitions. Three among them are with consecutive
group index, (1 | 2 ∪ 3 ∪ 4), (1 ∪ 2 | 3 ∪ 4) and (1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 | 4).
We denote a set composed by these three partitions as Σc.
We need to show the remaining four partitions are no better
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than some partition in Σc. To show this, we only need to
transform them to some three-group case and apply the result
of Lemma 4.
• Case 1: (1∪ 4, 2∪ 3) is not optimal since we can prove
(1∪ 2∪ 3, 4) ∈ Σc is better. To show it, we take 2∪ 3 as
a whole, then by Lemma 4, it follows that ∆V (1, 4) >
∆V (1, 2 ∪ 3).
• Case 2: (2, 1∪ 3∪ 4) is not optimal, since we can prove
(1∪ 2, 3∪ 4) ∈ Σc is better. To show it, we take 3∪ 4 as
a whole, then by Lemma 4, it follows ∆V (1, 3 ∪ 4) >
∆V (1, 2).
• Case 3: (3, 1∪ 2∪ 4) is not optimal, since we can prove
(1∪2∪3, 4) ∈ Σc is better. To show it, we take 1∪2 as a
whole, then by Lemma 4, it follows that ∆V (1∪ 2, 4) >
∆V (1 ∪ 2, 3).
• Case 4: (1∪ 3, 2∪ 4) is not optimal, since we can prove
(1∪ 2∪ 3, 4) ∈ Σc is better. To show it, by Lemma 4, it
follows that ∆V (2, 4) > ∆V (2, 3), and that ∆V (1, 3)
(b)
>
∆V (1, 2∪ 3). Here inequality (b) is also easily obtained,
if we notice that θ1 > θ2∪3 > θ3, thus group 2 ∪ 3 can
be also treated as the role of group 2 in Lemma 4.
Now Let us prove Theorem 4. For convenience, we in-
troduce the notation Compound group, such as Pre(i) or
Post(i), which represents some part of a cluster with ordered
group indices. For a group i in some cluster, Pre(i) (or
Post(i)) refers as a compound group composing of all the
groups with willingness to pay larger (or smaller) than that of
group i. For example, in a cluster 1∪2∪3∪5∪7∪8, Pre(3) =
1∪2, Post(3) = 5∪7∪8. Note that compound groups can be
empty, denoted as ∅. In last example, Pre(1) = Post(8) = ∅.
Since all the groups within the compound group belong to one
cluster, we can apply Lemma 2. For example, with the previous
cluster setting, NPre(3) = N1+N2, and θPre(3) = N1θ1+N2θ2N1+N2 .
By this equivalence rule, a compound group actually has not
much difference with one original group. The conclusions of
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 can be easily extended to compound
groups.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose that the group
indices order within each cluster is increasing.
Now consider one partition with discontinuous group in-
dices within some clusters. We can check the group indices
continuity for every single group. For example, a group c
belonging to a cluster C, and its next neighbor in this cluster
is group d, if c − d = 1, then the group indices until c are
consecutive, and if c − d > 1, then the group indices are
discontinuous, and we find a gap between c and d.
Suppose that checking group indices continuity for each
group following the increasing indices order (or equiva-
lently decreasing willingness to pay order) from group 1 to
group Kpp. We do not find any gap until group u1 in cluster U .
We denote group u1 next neighbor in cluster U is group u2.
Since there is a gap between u1 and u2, there exists a group v
in another cluster V and satisfying v = u1+1 < u2. Now we
can construct a better partition by rearranging the two clusters
U and V , while keeping other clusters unchanged. We can
view U as (Pre(u2) ∪ Post(u1)), and V as (v ∪ Post(v)),
since there is no group before v in super-group V , otherwise
it contradicts with the fact that we do not find any gap until
group u1. It is easy to show that there is some new partition
better than the original one by Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. There
are two cases depending on whether Post(v) is empty or
not. If Post(v) = ∅, according to Lemma 4, we find another
partition with U ′ = Pre(u2) ∪ v, V ′ = Post(u1) better than
the original U and V . If Post(v) 6= ∅, no matter θPost(v)
is larger than θPost(u2) or not, according to Lemma 5, it is
easy to construct other partitions better than the original U
and V , since the compound groups in these original clusters
(U = (Pre(u2) ∪ Post(u1)), and V = (v ∪ Post(v))) does
not satisfy property of consecutive group indices within each
cluster.
In conclusion, we show that for general cases, if there is any
gap in the partition, then we can construct another partition
that is better, which is equivalent to that the optimal partition
must satisfy consecutive group indices within each cluster.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: Since Ui(s, pq) is a strictly increasing function in
the interval [0, s∗i ], then (32) holds, if and only if the following
inequality holds:
Ui(s
∗
q , pq) ≤ Ui(si→q , pq), ∀i < q. (51)
Since t1q > · · · > tKq , (51) can be simplified to
t2q−1q ln tq−1q − (t2q−1q− 1)+
∑K
k=1Nktkq∑K
k=1Nk + S
(tq−1q − 1) ≥ 0,
(52)
where tiq =
√
θi
θq
. With a slight abuse of notation, we
abbreviate tq−1q as tq , (q = 2, . . . ,K) in the sequel. It is
easy to see that the following inequality is the necessary and
sufficient condition of (52) for q = 2, and sufficient condition
of (52) for q > 2:
t2q ln tq − (t2q − 1) +
tq
∑q−1
k=1Nk +Nq∑K
k=1Nk + S
(tq − 1) ≥ 0. (53)
Let g(t) be the left hand side of the inequality (53). It is
easy to check that g(t) is a convex function, with g(1) = 0,
g(∞) = ∞ and g′(1) < 0. So there exists a root tq > 1.
When t > tq, the inequality (53) holds, thus (51) holds, and
the conclusion in Theorem 6 follows.
